A group of people stand in an unbuilt plot of land in an urban context. Some of them hold maps, and they are intently observing their surroundings.

Four things I learned building a cohousing project in Brussels

I am part of a group which is building a cohousing in Brussels. It’s a risky endeavor but I could just not resist it: I dislike how the real estate market has financialized the right of humans to decent housing, and I dislike how the manner of building homes have made us lonely, alienated, surrounded by strangers. As an economist, I also find modern housing incredibly inefficient, because it does not produce public goods – like common spaces and communities – that are, by definition, the most efficient goods there are. And so, after many years of longing and reflections, in late 2021 I found myself in a small group willing to try it out, and took the plunge. Our cohousing is called The Reef in tribute to the diverse webs of cooperation and competition that exists in real coral reefs, and also as an act of remembrance should all coral reefs in the world die, which is not unlikely at all.

It is an incredibly rich, life-changing experience. It is also the second most difficult thing I have ever done (the first was founding a reasonably successful punk-folk band), and the one with the first-highest stakes (for most of us it is all of our lives’ savings). Yet, I never posted about it before, with one exception at the beginning of the journey. Frankly, I was not sure of what lessons one could draw from it: we were certainly working hard, but were we getting anywhere? Were we on our way to success, or just deluding ourselves? I could not tell. In the legal framework and economic landscape of Belgium in the 2020s, building a cohousing is a highly uncertain affair. At every turn, you face another obstacle that has the potential to stop the entire project dead in its track. Will we find a site to build the cohousing in? Will we be able to work together in reasonable harmony, or will the group collapse under the weight of interpersonal conflict? Is there even enough demand for cohousings to complete a group? Will the war in the East make construction materials unaffordable, and our project with it?

Still, people around me are interested in learning about cohousing. Many have encouraged me to start sharing my reflections about it. And it is the right time: the project has reached a degree of maturity where, I think, we can start drawing some lessons from it – though it could still fail, of course. There is a lot to share, but I am going to start with only few of the clearest learnings so far.

1. Self-managed projects are surprisingly efficient

Over the years, I have spoken to many people that dream of living in a cohousing. Despite this, it is almost impossible to just go out and buy a house or an apartment that is part of one. There appears to be what economists call a market failure: there is a market demand for a more social way of living, but no supply. So, if you want to live in a cohousing you will most likely need to start a group, or join one, and have your cohousing built to specifications. Groups must make a choice as to how to organize themselves. One possibility is for the group to directly take charge of the project management: find a site to buy, negotiate with the owner, purchase it, hire an architect and a construction company, organize the financial flows and so on. The other is to hire a company that will take care of the project management for you. In Belgium we are fortunate that there exist two such companies.

The Reef chose to be a self-managed group. In practice, this means that a bunch of random people, none of whom is a real estate or construction professional, is now running a 9 million Euro real estate project. Counterintuitively, this is working better than we had any right to expect: processes are transparent and relatively fast. We learned to work as a team quite quickly, and there is a high level of accountability. The Reef is a healthier, more efficient working environment than many professional spaces I have worked in. We have to work harder, but that work will pay for itself in terms of added trasparency and fuller ownership of the project. There is pride and joy in working together as a group to build our future home, and we believe that doing it this way will make our little community even more cohesive – and we save money.

2. Building community comes natural

Most people in our group did not know each other before joining. Most of us joined not based on previous friendships or family ties, but because we are drawn to the idea of cohousing itself. Some of us thought this might pose a challenge: in this kind of project people are making large investments in an endeavor the outcome of which depends on their cohousing mates playing nice. A lot of trust is needed. Among the many challenges of cohousing, this one turned out to be fairly easy. Common involvement in this kind of project builds mutual trust, even friendships, relatively quickly. This is because the project itself gets you into repeated interactions with each other. Reputation is obviously valuable, so people do not like to drop the ball on one another other. In a short time, you realize you can trust these people after all, and start to relax and enoy their company. I have no doubt that The Reef will be an imperfect but functional, and even beautiful, community.

3. Process and information tidiness are critical

In 2021, as a prequel to the formal start of the process of building The Reef, the founding group spent a few months researching cohousing. We read up on everything we could find, and engaged with extant cohousing groups to learn from their experiences. We also arranged to visit several already-built cohousings. All sources pointed to how critical good process is.

The reasoning is straightforward. Building a cohousing takes 4-7 years. During this period, you will be doing weekly meetings plus individual- or small-group work. All of this effort is unpaid, and you will still have all of your personal and professional responsibilities. You might even be asked to step up a little to cover for your cohousing mates: for example, in our group parents of small children are given a pass, and just asked to respect the deadlines and otherwise do what they can.

In a situation like this, it is super important to be methodical and efficient, or you will become overwhelmed. The Reef is very methodical, on two fronts. First, we are organized according to a variant of a model called sociocracy. This means plenaries + teams that report to the plenary and do the heavy lifting of preparing the decisions for the plenary to take. All meetings are facilitated (by a Team Facilitation, whose members took trainings in sociocratic methods). The entire group took trainings in non-violent communication as a measure to prevent the escalation of conflicts. This method is very efficient, and it saves time on decision making that we sorely need for operations. For example, while searching for a site we scouted the entire city on bicycles and on foot for six months, mapping and evaluating 170 potential sites. Even with a fairly large group of a dozen active adults, you see why efficiency is so important.

Second, we take information management seriously, and adopted ways inspired by the open source and open knowledge movement. All information is public by default, and protected only if there is a need for confidentiality. A very successful move was to ban emails completely, and instead move our communication onto an online forum. This reduces Inbox stress and allows people full access to every communication, letting them choose what they want to engage with. It also makes past communications very searchable (we even use tags consistently, something that I have not experienced in any other working environment). Do not underestimate the impact of using good forum software over email – let alone stuff like Facebook or Whatsapp or Slack groups, which is not, repeat not, optimized for economical and accountable communication! Our forum as of now hosts over 10,000 messages, and has over 300,000 pageviews, and the fact that it allows access while not flooding us with notifications is valuable. Transparency is also important

From open source culture we also learned the importance of good documentation: for example, we have a guide to The Reef’s digital assets, one to using tags and groups in the forum, one to making changes to the website, a manual to onboard new members, a governance document. Each one of these shares knowledge and empowers everyone in the group, removing organizational bottlenecks, at the cost of having to write things down in a clear and accessible format.

4. A cohousing ecosystem is coalescing in Brussels

Self-managed groups like ours need not be navigating uncharted waters all the time. To our surprise and delight, cohousing is something like a movement. People support each other, mostly with information that can save us enormous amount of time. The advice we received from our sister cohousings at the beginning of the journey was invaluable. Also, there are now a few professionals in Brussels that understand cohousing and have experience of building them: the architects’ studio Stekke and Fraas has already built three cohousings in Brussels; Mark Van den Dries, a retired entrepreneur that has led several successful cohousing projects (he lives in one) and now offers himself as a coach; the Namur notary Pierre-Yves Erneux. A Dutch-Belgian bank, Triodos, offers mortgages adapted to the reality of cohousing.

All this means that we have it much easier than first-generation cohousings. Like all economic movements, cohousing is cumulative: if you were to start a project now, you would face fewer uncertainties than we did, because you could build on our experience. And if you or someone you know did start a cohousing, I would be interested to learn about it, be it through a link you share or by sharing war stories over coffee.

Photo: The Reef’s group explore a candidate site for the cohousing project in summer 2024. CC-BY The Reef Cohousing

A system working as intended: appreciation for the Belgian authorities in charge of asylum applications

I have a story that I feel needs to be shared. It happened three weeks ago, and made me proud to be Belgian.

A friend – I will call her Caroline – got in touch after a silence of several years. We used to work together back in the day, and had become friends. We had stayed in touch, very irregularly, through a common friend, who, like me, lives in Brussels. Caroline herself, who lived in the US when we worked together, was now back to France.

She had another former colleague, a man I will call Malik. Malik is Palestinian, and lives in Gaza with his wife and two children, 4 and 3 years old. You can see where this is going. His house was bombed, twice. His immediate family was unharmed, though some of his nephews, that used to play with his children, are gone.

Malik managed to get his family into Egypt via Rafah. Thanks to Caroline’s invitation, he obtained a tourist visa for the family to travel to the USA. With her help, he tried to obtain political asylum in the USA and Canada. But nothing worked. At the end of the customary three months, the visa was about to expire. So, Caroline’s message told us “Malik has decided to apply for refugee status in Belgium. Can you help?”

It turned out we could, a little bit. Mostly with information, and by giving him someone that he could call, a friendly voice in the New Place.

So in they flew, Malik and his wife and their two children, with a stopover in Brussels and a connecting flight to Cairo. They had a plan, supported by information we could find on the Belgian end: intentionally miss the flight to Cairo, then report to the airport authorities and ask for asylum.

It turns out that Belgium has an “airport track” for asylum seekers, and that it becomes very fast when minor children are involved. Malik and his family were first made to wait, and yes, after a long flight from the US and with two small children that’s not a joke.

But at the end of that wait, the system kicked into gear. The family was put into a car and driven to a building in the airport’s region. They were given the keys to an apartment, some money to buy food and information on where to buy it, and told to get some rest.

As the weekend came around, my girlfriend, who had taken point on the whole Malik initiative, went to meet the family and accompany it on a trip to Antwerp.

The trip was, she reports, very touching. They had a story to tell, and they wanted to tell it. They had photos on their phones: a house shot to pieces. Toys retrieved from the rubble. The missing cousins of the children, who they will never see again (though they have not been told that yet).

But check this out: they had an appointment with the Federal agency which processes asylum requests for the intake interview on the following Monday, less than one week after arrival!

The interview went something like this: the whole family had their photos and biometrics taken and was issued ID cards. After which, the official in charge basically told them: look, the situation is clear. You are from Gaza and cannot go back. Your status as refugee is straightforward and we might not even bother with a second interview. Welcome to Belgium. Here is information about your rights and the support that come with refugee status. See you in five years when you apply for citizenship.

The language was no doubt more formal (I was not there), but that was the gist of it.

It’s going to be difficult for them. Malik is a highly qualified professional, but the truth is many Belgian landlords do not like to rent to refugees. He and the family will have to learn French or Dutch to function in society. But this, by the Gods, is the asylum system working as intended. Belgium is a member state of the United Nations, which voted to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (Belgium voted in favour). So, it is now beholden to it, and that implies offering safe haven to Malik and his family. No ifs, no buts. This is honorable.

And meanwhile my cohousing group is trying to make this a softer landing for the family. Since the group organizes some social event, it is easy to act as a sort-of-peer group for the adults while they find their feet.

Also, someone is organizing a Sinterklaas visit for their children, and maneuvers are in place to involve Malik’s little monsters.

(Because Belgium, we do not care for Santa Claus, and have our own version)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinterklaas

And look, the gods know that Belgium can be gleefully dysfunctional and infuriating at times. Look up “Belgian solution” and you’ll see what I mean. And the Belgian government is so blasé about dysfunctionality that it makes it own jokes about the Belgian government. But underneath it all, there are (some) functioning bureaucracies, and some simple just doing the bloody job, ESPECIALLY if your job is standing up for the underdog and the people in need.

And here, I have to say, I am having a bit of a patriotic moment, and am proud of the country where I chose to make my own stand, and of my fellow Belgians. I was never happier and prouder to have become one of you. Let’s keep doing this. Laten we dit blijven doen. Continuons comme ça. <3

The Eurotower in Frankfurt, headquarters of the European Central Bank

The Draghi Report vs. New Economic Thinking (long)

In September 2024, the European Commission published a report titled The future of European competitiveness, better known as “the Draghi report” after the name of its lead author, former European Central Bank governor Mario Draghi. While Brussels politics is as subject to hype cycles as politics anywhere else, this particular report packs an unusual amount of firepower. The mission letters received by all incoming European Commissioners from Commission president Ursula von der Leyen tell them in no uncertain terms to draw on it. The president herself is clearly already doing that, to the point of tweaking Teresa Ribera’s job title into “Executive Vice President-designate for a clean, just and competitive transition” (emphasis mine). This appears to be the latest rebranding of the “twin transitions” (green and digital) of the 2019 von der Leyen Commission.

The 2024 von der Leyen Commission aspires to deliver economic reform, and prepares to invoke the Draghi report as the rationale for its reform agenda. This comes at an interesting time for economic policy, because in recent years – after decades of incremental tinkering around the neoclassical model – economists have come up with several new, bold theories, models, and policy implications thereof. This body of work is new enough that people are still discussing what it should be called: in what follows I call it New Economic Thinking (NET), mirroring this 2022 report by Demos Helsinki.

NET is not a single new paradigm; rather, it is a collection of approaches (Demos calls it  “a landscape”). They differ, but share the conviction that neoclassical economics is unfit for purpose, and that, once you let go of the old orthodoxy, new instruments for economic policies become available. Methodologically, many of the authors associated with NET are skeptical about measuring human wellbeing in monetary terms, and prefer to fall back on physical quantities like calories intakes or square meters of housing (more on this). In fact, many of them have intellectual roots in disciplines other than economics, such as physics ( Julia Steinberger, Ole Peters) or anthropology (Jason Hickel). NET approaches have names like degrowth; post-growth; modern monetary theory; doughnut economics; wellbeing economics; and more. Both NET scholars and the group behind the Draghi report call for reform. In this article, I want to look at the report through the prism of NET, and reflect on the similarities and differences between the two.

1. Report narrative

The Draghi report starts with three statements.

  1. The European Union needs economic growth to realize its ambitions on social cohesion, decarbonization and strategic autonomy.
  2. Its economy suffers from a large and growing competitiveness gap with respect to the rival economies of the USA and China. This gap must be closed to achieve the EU’s strategic objectives.
  3. To increase competitiveness, Europe must invest massively, way more than at any point in its history, and pursue coherent policies across multiple areas. This is true for economics policies writ large, and beyond: trade, competition, industrial, monetary, defence development cooperation. All these policies must be tightly integrated and put in service of the overarching strategic goal of being competitive.

Given these premises, the report identifies intervention areas: ten sectoral policies (energy, critical raw materials, digitalisation and advanced technologies – in turn broken down into high speed and broadband networks, computing and AI and semiconductors – clean tech, automotive, defence, space, pharma and transport) and five horizontal ones (accelerating innovation, closing the skills gap, revamping competition and strengthening governance). The bulk of the report then proposes, for each of these policies, some concrete objectives and the interventions to achieve them.

2. Competitiveness through a New Economic Thinking lens

Let’s look at the three statements from a NET perspective.

The first statement is obviously problematic. Most NET authors would outright deny that social cohesion, decarbonization and strategic need economic growth. And they would be mostly right. There is ample evidence for the opposite thesis, that the emissions of greenhouse gases such as CO2 are tightly correlated with economic growth. Neoclassical economists point out that, in theory, emissions can be decoupled from output; the former can decrease as the latter increases. This is called “absolute decoupling” and features as target 8.4 of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. Absolute decoupling is empirically possible, and has been observed in some of the wealthier countries. However, it has only ever happened at very slow rates. Even for the best-performing countries, decoupling should speed up by a factor ten in order for them to respect their commitments under the Paris Agreement. Many NET economists believe demand policies are a safer and more efficient way to keep human civilization within the planetary boundaries: for example, shifting from driving cars to transit and cycling gets you a lot more emissions reduction per Euro invested than shifting from internal combustion engine cars to electric ones. In a slogan, NET economists believe green growth to be a myth. French economist Timothée Parrique makes this point clearly and forcefully in this short video.

Similarly, many NET scholars refute the idea of a positive linkage between economic growth and social cohesion. We have known for a long time that reported satisfaction is uncorrelated to GDP per capita: this is called the happiness-income paradox and was discovered by James Easterlin in 1974. More recently, Ole Peters has shown that systems that grow on average while practically all its participants are reduced into poverty are perfectly possible : indeed, such systems arise naturally when the income of individuals grows randomly and multiplicatively over time, like most financial markets most of the time.

As for social cohesion, it has now become  clear that, from a NET standpoint, there is no automatic path from economic growth to poverty reduction. This is a key concern for academic thinkers like Jason Hickel (who argues rich countries are better off with degrowth instead), Giorgos Kallis, Tim Jackson and others. Judging from the recent report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights – bearing the NET-friendly title Eradicating poverty beyond growth – these ideas are getting buy-in in the global policy space.

Social cohesion is also linked to decarbonization. The debate on just transitions shows that decarbonization is much harder for the financially more vulnerable, and therefore harder to do in more unequal societies. Joel Millward-Hopkins calculated that highly unequal systems require far more energy to provide everyone with decent living standards. The implication is that  inequality is a drain on productivity when you measure input in physical terms and output in human well-being.

The second statement – that the European economy is less competitive than the economies of the US and China, and that this is a bad thing – looks a priori reasonable. Seen through a NET prism, however, it raises empirical and normative questions. How do we measure competitiveness? By dividing the input into the economy by it output. How does the Draghi report measure output? I have not found a methodology section in the published report, but Figure 1 uses GDP to compute productivity. That’s a fatally flawed measure of productivity, because it misses what economies are actually supposed to be producing. That would be human well-being, and GDP is simply not fit to measure it, not even approximately.  This has been known since Simon Kuznets operationalized it in 1934, so I will not embark on a critique here. Suffice it to say that, when you log primary forest, you increase GDP. When you sell a public park to a real estate developer to build luxury housing on, you increase GDP. It is a wildly inadequate measure of economic performance. It is disappointing to see it used in a document of the importance of the Draghi report. NET scholars would have tried to estimate physical productivity: for example, by comparing worked hours and material input with some measure of human welfare like the United Nations’ Human Development Index.

The Draghi report’s reliance on GDP as a proxy of welfare means that its authors accept the neoclassical theory of value based on utility theory, and believe that the fundamental theorems of welfare economics apply to the European economy, at least approximately. NET thinkers reject these beliefs, as do most people who are not professional economists. This leads the report to pursuing an economy that, at times, can feel dystopian – like when the report laments that most pension systems in Europe are public and mutualized, instead of private and finance-based like in the US. This is a bad thing, if you are an investment banker, because it leaves much less hot money sloshing around on financial markets for you to profit from. But if you are a human believing in human solidarity, unwilling to trust financial markets with providing for you in your old age, you are likely to find it rather good.

From the point of view of non-investment bankers, the Draghi report suffers from a “garbage in, garbage out” problem: the best analysis will still be useless, or worse, if it aims at optimizing the wrong indicator.

3. Policy innovation – but to do what?

The third statement – that the European Union is not investing nearly enough in its future, and suffers and a gap in policy coherence with respect to the USA and China – seems intuitively correct. Europe is polycentric in nature, so everything is a hard-achieved compromise, including investment. “Frugal” member states are notoriously suspicious of public investment, seen as a machine to produce Southern European public debt and shift it to Northern Europeans. Even when there are no ideological disagreements, polycentricity means that a certain amount of horse trading is baked into any major policy decision in Brussels. On average, this reduces policy coherence: it is hard, for example, to imagine a European version of the American Inflation Reduction Act.

I can imagine several NET authors agreeing with Draghi here. Already in the foreword, the report calls for unprecedented levels of investment.

To digitalise and decarbonise the economy and increase our defence capacity, the investment share in Europe will have to rise by around 5 percentage points of GDP to levels last seen in the 1960s and 70s. This is unprecedented: for comparison, the additional investments provided by the Marshall Plan between 1948-51 amounted to around 1-2% of GDP annually.

This can-do attitude resonates with the insistence of NET scholars that we can and should do things differently, if “differently” brings better results. Scholars like Stephanie Kelton, Mariana Mazzucato, Thomas Piketty, Kate Raworth, Randall Wray have produced substantial economic policy innovations, and are advocating, sometimes successfully, for their implementation. These and other NET thinkers believe Margaret Thatcher’s quip, “there is no alternative”, to be wrong. Apparently, so does Draghi. How to organize the economy is a political choice, not an inevitability. Policy makers are more free than the study of neoclassical economics has led us to believe.

Mario Draghi began his career as an academic economist. But he is best known as a banker and a policy maker; a practitioner, more than a theorist. So, it is no surprise that the most interesting content of the report that bears his name is its discussion of various specific policies. There is some solid advice here, built on insightful analysis. For example, Chapter 3 (“A joint decarbonisation and competitiveness plan”) starts with a discussion on the root cause of energy prices. The report argues that the price of energy – gas in particular – is made “unnecessarily high” by institutional factors. Even long-term contracts are indexed to spot energy prices, and spot energy markets are vulnerable to speculation because (1) the supply is highly concentrated, and (2) the European regulation on commodities derivatives grants exemptions to companies whose primary purpose is not trading. Energy prices can be reduced and stabilized by de-financializing the energy markets; abolishing exemptions from regulation on commodities derivatives trading is a good place to start, and indeed is part of the American playbook. In a similar vein, the report offers good advice in Chapter 6, dedicated to governance: consolidate coordination mechanism; consolidate budgetary resources; extend decision making by qualified majority voting in the European Council, and so on. These are not new ideas, but the Commission may hope that Draghi’s prestige lends them extra weight.

But not all the report’s policy advice is unambiguously good. Viewed through the lens of NET, some policy proposals suffer from the fundamental misalignment, noted above, on what a “good” economy looks like. If you – like me – are sympathetic to NET approaches, it sometimes makes for disturbing reading. Several times I found things that I believe are (good) features of the European economy described as bugs. For example, regulating the tech sector (the use of the precautionary principle, data protection laws, compliance on AI) may be “a barrier to scaling up” (Chapter 2), but it has protected European citizens, at least a little bit, from the worst data protection and privacy abuse of the tech giants. Same story in Chapter 5, where the report deplores the weakness of private equity funds on the European markets. This certainly raised my eyebrows: private equity is known for asset stripping companies and impoverishing workers to the benefit of the wealthy (“buy, strip and flip”). Cory Doctorow describes its effects in a colourful, but factually correct, way:

When PE buys up all the treatment centers for kids with behavioral problems, they hack away at staffing and oversight, turning them into nightmares where kids are routinely abused, raped and murdered (NBC News). When PE buys up nursing homes, the same thing happens, with elderly residents left to sit in their own excrement and then die (Politico).

Here is a Guardian article with many links to the documented effects on private equity on the economy. It is safe to say they are not productive at all. They only appear so if you insist measuring economic output wrong. Adopting a NET perspective would have avoided the dystopian moments in the report.

4. A deeper European integration

The report builds on technical arguments to advocate for deeper European integration. We need to increase productivity; to increase productivity, we need bold, tightly coordinated policies across the board; to have those, we need deeper integration. European institutions must work in a more coherent way with one another; member states must work in a more coherent way with the EU (in Chapter 1). Specifically:

  1. If tighter integration means a two-tier EU (a tightly integrated core, plus a more loosely integrate outer layer), so be it.
  2. The EU should move towards “the issuance of a common safe asset” (in Chapter 5), by which Draghi means “emitting European sovereign debt”.

Deep integration of economic policy and sovereign debt issuance would bring the European Union closer to something like a federal state. This is a large step, but it appears much more realistic after the COVID crisis, when European institutions were deployed to protect the population from another massive financial crisis on top of the epidemic. Debt was issued, overcoming the resistance of the “frugal” member states, and the worst was avoided. Achieving social cohesion while decarbonizing the economy, Draghi argues, is also a crisis, in the sense that it cannot wait. He is not wrong in that. Why not, then, use the same instruments that have served us well before?

I expect that most of the public debate on the Draghi report will focus on these two proposals. Considerations more pertinent to NET, such as those on value theory and indicators of economic performance, are likely to be the province of economics geeks like myself. Still, GDP as a reliable measure of well-being? In 2024? it seems like a missed opportunity. Draghi could have made his two main proposals for European integration equally well from a NET standpoint. That would likely elicit more public support: most Europeans are facing insecurity and are more likely to support policy mixes that zero in on their well-being rather than on self-referential constructs like “the economy”.

Photo: The Eurotower in Frankfurt am Main by Marco Verch under Creative Commons 2.0